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Abstract Federal, state, and local government agencies have joined forces in the
ambitious and expensive task of improving the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay.
Clean-up efforts will be devoted to three major problems: nutrient over enrichment,
toxic substances, and the decline of submerged aquatic vegetation. Although the
beneficiaries are ultimately human, criteria for judging the Bay's water quality have
been primarily biological and physical. This paper addresses the question of the
human values from the Bay. How do people use the Bay and how much are they
willing to pay for the changes in water quality that improve their use? With a variety
of methods and data sources, we estimate the annual aggregate willingness to pay for
a moderate improvement in the Chesapeake Bay's water quality to be in the range of
$10 to $100 million in 1984 dollars.
Introduction
Over the past decade, the Chesapeake Bay has been the focus of an impressive amount of
research and the beneficiary of numerous environmental programs. Concentrated efforts
began in 1976 when the Congress directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to
conduct a five-year study of the Bay's resources and water quality. The study focused on
three major problems of the Bay—nutrient overenrichment, toxic substances, and the
decline of submerged aquatic vegetation. In 1983 the three surrounding states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the federal government signed a pact, the Chesapeake Bay Agree-
ment of 1983, committing them to improve and protect water quality of the Chesapeake
Bay through coordinated activities.
The first plan of the Chesapeake Bay Commission was the Chesapeake Bay Restora-
tion and Protection Plan of September 1985. The plan states the goals:
Improve and protect the water quality and living resources of the Chesa-
peake Bay estuarine system (in order) to restore and maintain the Bay's
ecological integrity, productivity, and beneficial uses and to protect public
health.'
The goals of the Restoration and Protection Plan are broad, and include general refer-
ence to ecological and human health issues, as well as productive use by humans.2 A^. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
However, there is no clear connection between the goals of the Bay program and the way
people who pay for it are expected to benefit.
To accomplish the goals, specific objectives and implementation strategies have been
developed. Many of these strategies are designed to reduce or control nutrients. Major
strategies to control point sources of nutrients include plans to provide grants to design,
construct, operate, and maintain sewage treatment facilities, and plans to support phos-
phorous removal projects at treatment plants. The primary strategy for controlling non-
point sources of nutrients to the Bay has been the subsidy of management practices to
reduce runoff from urban, forested, and, in particular, agricultural lands. More re-
cently, the governors of Maryland and Virginia agreed to reduce nutrient loads
by 40%. The plan enacted a series of additional policies to reduce or control the level of
toxic materials in the Bay. Lastly, the Chesapeake Bay Restoration and Protection Plan
instituted a series of policies designed directly to "provide for the restoration and protec-
tion of living resources and their habitats and ecological relationships"^ in the Chesa-
peake.
In this article, we estimate the value of a moderate improvement in water quality in
the Bay. This task is tackled given the typical limitations on research. We rely on a
variety of different sources of data, gathered by others for different purposes. We as-
sume untestable relationships between human behavior and physical and biological water
quality changes. Finally, our results depend on a variety of maintained hypotheses about
the estimated models, including error distributions, functional forms, and estimation
approaches. Our results aid in understanding both the benefits of improving the Chesa-
peake Bay and the value of nonmarket benefit techniques.
There are two motives for this study. First it helps us understand how people use the
Bay, the ways in which they derive enjoyment from it, and the paths through which
environmental quality affects them. The Restoration and Protection Plan is notably
vague in defining how individuals benefit from environmental improvements. Whereas
human use is emphasized in a broad context, objectives are defined in scientific
(chemical, biological) terms. A better understanding of human use and perceptions
of the Bay can help focus clean-up efforts in ways that would generate the greatest
payoff.
Programs to improve the Bay cost society in various ways, providing a second
motive for our study. For example, agricultural best management practices impose re-
strictions on fanners and require taxes from the general population. These programs are
undertaken in part because the Bay provides valuable services to people. The amount
people are willing to pay for the services of a cleaner Chesapeake Bay is one reasonable
measure of the value of those services. We are interested in what people are willing to
pay for access to recreational activities of the Bay, and how their willingness to pay
changes as water quality improves.
Consequently, this is not an article about nonmarket methods. Rather it is a paper
that uses methods in an attempt to address the larger question: what is the monetary
worth of pursuing the programs suggested by the Chesapeake Bay Restoration and Pro-
tection Plan? We focus on the recreational benefits because we believe that most of the
increase in well-being accrues to recreationists. Whereas there is considerable discussion
about the benefits to commercial fishing, it is not clear that society gets any long-run
benefits there in the absence of well-defined property rights. We employ both the contin-
gent valuation technique and indirect or behavior-based techniques. Only the contingent
valuation approach allows insights into the value of Bay improvements to nonusers. We
report the results of this analysis first.Chesapeake Bay Water Quality 3
Using Contingent Valuation to Measure the Economic Benefits
of Improved Water Quality
In this section, contingent valuation is used to value improvements in water quality in the
Chesapeake Bay. We consider a hypothetical change of the Bay's water quality from its
current condition to an improved condition, which the respondent considers acceptable
for swimming. Because individuals' perceptions of water quality are not easily linked to
objective measures and because individuals do not easily understand these scientific
measures, the gauge of acceptability in this analysis rests with the individual.
The individuals in the contingent valuation experiment are a subset of a telephone
survey of the Baltimore-Washington SMS A. Each of the randomly selected households
was asked "Do you consider the water quality in the Chesapeake to be acceptable of
unacceptable for swimming and/or other water activities?" In the context of this ques-
tion, we can think of "acceptable" of "unacceptable" as proxies for "good" or "bad."
Many users judged the water "unacceptable." Of the 959 respondents, more than one-
half (57%) found the water quality unacceptable. Those who so responded were asked
whether they would be willing to pay an amount ($A) in extra state or federal taxes per
year, providing the water quality was improved so that it was acceptable for swimming.
The amount of money ($A) was varied randomly from $5 to $50 per year over the
sample. About 65% of the population who found water quality unacceptable were will-
ing to pay an amount up to $20 if it were made acceptable. If the amount of the tax were
raised to between $25 and $35, the percent of respondents who were willing to pay
dropped to 54%. Finally, about 49% of those who answered that water quality was
unacceptable were willing to pay between $40 and $50 a year. The percent responses by
cells are given in Table 1.
The yes or no responses can be used to estimate willingness to pay via the referen-
dum model (Hanemann 1984). The respondent derives utility from the water quality,
money income (y), and a vector (x) of individual characteristics. Utility is given by
u(l,y;x) when the water quality is acceptable and u(O,y;x) when it is not. Utility is
composed of a deterministic element v and a stochastic element 6.
Table 1
Percent of People Willing to Pay Additional Taxes for
Acceptable Water Quality for Swimming by Amount of Tax
Amount of Respondents Offered the Increase
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u(j,y;x) = v(j,y;x) + 6^ j = 0,1 (1)
where 6^ are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero.
When offered swimmable water at a tax of $A, the individual will accept if
v(l,y-A;x) -H 5, > v(O,y;x) -I- 6^ (2)
and decline otherwise. The probability of an individual's response is
Pr[accept tax to get swimmable water] = Pr[v(l,y-A;x) - v(O,y;x) > rj)
where r\ = GQ - 0,. Let F,(-) be the cumulative distribution function of ij. Then the
probability of accepting the tax to get swimmable water equals F^(Av) where Av is just
the difference in the deterministic portion of equation (2).
To complete the analysis, we choose a linear function for v(-) and a logistic function
for 7].
v(j,y) = aj -I- /3 y |8 > 0. (3)
The arguments of x are suppressed into the constant aj. The difference (Av) is (a, - QQ)
- ;8A, which gives a probability model of the form
F(r?) = nP(-«o + a, - /3Ai)]J];[l - F(-a, + a, - ^A,)] (4)
its
where i is an index of individuals, SQ is the set of individuals who prefer the unimproved
state, and S, is the set who prefer the improved state with tax SA." F(-) is the logistic
distribution.
Welfare analysis can proceed with a measure of central tendency of willingness to
pay. Define A* as the amount of money that makes the individual indifferent between the
improvement and the tax (j = 1) and no improvement (j = 0). At this level of the tax,
utility is equal under each setting, implying
v(l,y-A*;x) + j-, = v(O,y;x) + v^. (5)
Combining (3) and (5) yields
A* = [(a, - a^)-
where r; is random. To evaluate the individual's willingness to pay for the "acceptable"
water quality, take the expected value of the random variable A*, treating ao, a,, and j8
as constants:
E[A*] = (a, - a,)l&. (6)
In the application, we modify equation (3) in two ways. One modification makes (a,
- ao depend on whether someone in the household had used or intended to use the
Chesapeake Bay in 1984. A summary variable (D, = 1 for users) is included to reflectChesapeake Bay Water Quality 5
use. This approach allows users to value the change in the Bay's water quality more than
nonusers, ceteris paribus. The other modification makes the income coefficient, /3, de-
pend on socioeconomic characteristics. We find race to be the most significant variable
in explaining bid. However, the race variable is likely to reflect not only cultural differ-
ences but income differences, since there was a wide disparity in mean income between
whites and nonwhites ($40,000 annually vs. $25,000) in the sample. The coefficient on
the tax variable, j3, represents the marginal utility of income. Since the socioeconomic
variable we have identified is linked with income, it makes sense that this factor will
alter j8. We estimate
v(l,u)-v(O,u) = a, - tto + «2Di - 0A - PiT^i^-
Table 2 reports results. The observations include only those who found the water
"unacceptable." Hence, aggregating the results will ignore those households who be-
lieve the water to be "acceptable" but nevertheless gain from improvements. The
amount of the tax reduces the probability of a respondent's willingness to pay the annual
tax increase in exchange for water quality improvement. Users are significantly more
likely to pay the tax increase for water quality improvements. Being white also makes
one more likely to pay for water quality improvements.
Using equation (6), we calculate the benefits of a representative individual in each
group. These results are found in Table 3. Users are willing to pay, on average, about
three times as much in extra taxes as nonusers. But nonusers are willing to pay a positive
amount. Both user and nonuser groups exhibit higher average willingness to pay bids
among white (or higher income) individuals. Among users, the mean willingness to pay
is $183 for whites and $34 for nonwhites. The corresponding figures are $48 and $9 for
nonusers. In the conclusion, we aggregate these benefits for the population of the
Baltimore-Washington SMSA.
Using Indirect Market Methods to Measure Water Quality Benefits
The contingent valuation approach covers a range of uses of the Bay. To gain insight into
specific uses and to buttress the broad results, we exploit behavior-based methods. Of
the various methods available, we choose two versions of the travel-cost model: the
Table 2
Logistic Model Estimates Related to the Probability a Respondent




























'D,, DJ represent binary variables taking the value of one for the use of the Bay and white racial
characteristics, respectively.N. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
Mean Willingness to Pay Tax Increase to Make the Bay "Acceptable" by Users
and Nonusers, 1984 Dollars
Respondents (%) Mean Willingness to Pay ($)
Users in 1984 43 121
Nonusers in 1984 57 38
varying parameter model and the pooled model. These approaches have shortcomings,
but they suit our data and are relatively easily applied.
To formalize the model, let the individual maximize constrained utility as a fiinction
of number of trips taken to the n quality-differentiated sites, the quality characteristics of
each site, and a Hicksian good. Thus
max u(x,q,z) s.t. px -I- z = y (7)
where x is an n-dimensional vector of trips to the n sites, p is a corresponding vector of
costs of accessing the sites where q,, i = 1, . . . , n is the water quality at the i"^ site, z is
the Hicksian good, and y is income.
Problem (7) defines n demand functions, each of which may be a function of all n
prices, n quality levels, and income:
Xi = gi(p,q,y) i = 1, . . . , n. (8)
Under most circumstances, however, this model cannot be estimated. Imagine having
observations on S individuals who visit site i. The quality characteristic at site i (q,)
is constant across the S individuals. The coefficients of the qi's cannot be esti-
mated when there is no variation in the qi's across observations.
There are several methods for resolving this dilemma. Some of them build on the
model presented in (8) (these are described in Bockstael et al. 1987a), whereas others
rely on discrete choice models (see Bockstael et al. 1987b). The varying parameters
model falls in the former category and follows similar methods applied by Vaughan and
Russell (1982a, b) and Smith and Desvousges (1985).
To motivate the varying parameters model, consider a linear demand function for the
i"" site:
Xj = /3oi + /3,iPi -I- /3,iP, -I- /3j,iy + e i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
where p, is the own price and p^ is the price of the nearest substitute. This is a linear,
parsimonious version of (8). Let the demand parameters be determinisitic functions of
the quality characteristics at the site. For example, the j8's might be linear functions of
the q's: ;Chesapeake Bay Water Quality
/3oi = To + TiQi
ao + "iQi
^0 + ^iqi
80 + 6,qi (10)
The model in (9) and (10) implies that variations in demand parameters across sites (i.e.,
variations in the JSQI'S, /3,i's, etc.) correspond to variations in own-site attributes (q,).
Together, (9) and (10) imply:
Xi = To + TiQi + («o +
+ (60 + 5iqi)y + e-
Although the model can be collapsed into one expression as in (11), the estimation
procedure usually involves two steps: estimate the model of trips to each site depending
on prices and income (e.g., n separate models) and regress the coefficients from the first
n regressions on the quality characteristics of the n sites. In practice, not all parameters
are allowed to vary. For the beach equations, there are eight parameters. We have used
only the most important economic parameters. Further, we have excluded parameters
that show no significant effects. The second step requires the application of generalized
least-squares because of the properties of the error structure implicit in the estimation of
(10), which must use estimated parameters (/3's) in place of the true ^'s.
In estimating the demand functions, one must account for the censored nature of trips
to sites. Some people take positive trips, others zero. Several estimation methods handle
this problem. We estimate the Tobit, although it has some weaknesses:
(P
otherwise,
where e is N(O,a^). The likelihood function is given by
;t>0\"/ \ " '' x-0
where Zj8 is the right-hand side of (12) and <i> and >i' are the density function and the
distribution function of the standard normal.
We estimate the Tobit model for three activities: beach use, boating, and fishing. The
data sets are different in their purpose, their year, and their coverage, but they are the
best sources of information about recreational activities on the Bay.
Beach Use
The beach model is estimated from a survey of 484 people at 11 public beaches on the
western shore of Maryland in the summer of 1984. The 484 individuals were randomly8 N. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
selected from sample beaches and days. The design is a two-stage stratified sample in
which a probability sample of beaches and days was selected and then a random sample
of persons was interviewed at each sample site.
Demand functions for 10 beaches are estimated using the Tobit model in equation
(12). In practice we find that income is insignificant but ownership of stock variables
(boat, recreational vehicle, swimming pool) is important. Further, we have enough in-
formation to estimate time costs using information on labor market participation (see
Bockstael et al. 1987b). Demand coefficients are in Table 4. The estimated coefficients
on own-price (travel cost) are all negative and most statistically significantly less than
zero. CoUinearity among the price and time variables may cause the large standard
errors for Miami, Morgantown, and Rod and Reel. In some instances, the coUinearity is
sufficiently troublesome so that only the own-price and own-time variables are included.
To complete the second stage, we need to choose a measure of water quality (q in
equation (1)). Our choices are limited by the absence of complete data covering all areas
of the Bay. Our measure of water quality is the product of nitrogen and phosphorus,
TNPj. The measure of TNPj is for the location nearest the beach. The measurement is
the mean level for summer months in 1977, the last year for which complete data are
available. A good case can be made for using this variable. Studies of the Bay conducted
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency indicate that perhaps the most significant
problem facing Bay restoration and protection efforts is nutrient overenrichment of Bay
waters. Both nitrogen and phosphorus contribute to enrichment. Excessive nutrient lev-
els may be the partial cause of decreased submerged aquatic vegetation, which in turn
has adverse effects on the food chain and on the habitat for many fish species. Further,
overenrichment leads to lower dissolved oxygen levels, which have additional adverse
effects on fish stocks, degrading the appearance of the water as well. High coUinearity
between nitrogen and phosphorus readings prevents separate inclusion of both variables
in the analysis. The product of nitrogen and phosphorus is used to avoid this problem
and to capture the interactive nature of these nutrients.
The results of the second-stage estimation, equation (10), are based on weighted
least-squares in which the weights were 1/CT^, the inverse of the standard error of the
coefficients for each beach. The estimated equations for the observations are
own-price: /3,j .0308 - .0002TNPj
(.04) (-2.22)
constant: &o] 2.66 - .00016TNPj
(-1.1) (-.001) (14)
where t-statistics are in parentheses.
The estimated effect of an increase in TNP is to make the demand function less steep
and the constant term lower. (To see the effect on the demand slope, recall that price is
on the vertical axis, quantity on the horizontal.) An increase in TNP increases the
amount a given price change reduces quantity, thus flattening the curve.
BoaHng
The boating analysis is based on a 1983 survey of boaters sponsored by the University of
Maryland Sea Grant Program and the Maryland Coastal Zone Management Program.
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sample provided equal representation to owners of boats kept in slips and owners who
trailered their boats. The survey, which sought a variety of information about the house-
hold and its boating activity, achieved a response rate of approximately 70%. In our
analysis, we use a sample of 496 boaters who trailer their boats. We cannot easily
analyze the choices of boats kept in slips because boat owners cannot choose the location
of their trip once they have chosen their marinas. Whereas owners of boats in marinas
may well benefit from improved water quality, those benefits are excluded from our
analysis.
Because we have a "second-hand" data set over which we had no control, a simpler
version of the demand function is estimated. The variables included are own-price,
substitute price (where the substitute is the county closest to the individual's home
county) and the owner's estimate of the value of the boat. The cost of time is included in
the individual's travel costs. The demand functions for each of the 12 county sites are
presented in Table 5. The results are remarkably consistent across sites. The own-price
coefficients are significantly less than zero at the 99% level of confidence. Substitute
price coefficients are all positive and significantly different from zero for 8 of the 12
sites. The coefficient on boat value is significantly greater than zero for seven of the
sites, suggesting that wealthier people or people with bigger boats take more boating
trips, ceteris paribus.
In the second stage, there are as many equations as there are parameters from the
first stage. With no expectations about which parameters might vary, we allow the test
statistics to determine the outcome.
The second stage model is given by
^kj = Ook + ttik TNPj -I- vj (15)
where k = 1, 4 (the number of parameters in each equation) and j = 1, 12 (the number
of sites). The regression of the own-cost coefficients from the linear first-stage model on
these environmental variables produced good results. The coefficient is significantly less
than zero. The negative sign suggests that the demand curve becomes less steep with
increasing levels of pollutants. The estimated equations for the 12 observations are:
own-price /3,j = - .0887 - .000102 TNPj
(4.29) (3.54)
substitute price ^2\ = 0682 - .000016 TNPj
(7.47) (1.73)
constant ;8oj = -19.41 -I- .007338 TNPj
(4.14) (1.93) (16)
No significant relationship was found for the income coefficient. The equations in (16)
are used to calculate the benefits of reductions in TNP.
Striped Bass Fishing in Maryland
The 1980 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation
(NSFHW) is the source data for analysis. Of the available data sets on Chesapeake Bay
sportfishing, the portions of this survey relating to saltwater recreational fishing in
Maryland, and by Maryland residents, offered the best prospects for modeling the ef-Chesapeake Bay Water Quality 11
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'Each equation is estimated with the 496 hoaters who trailer their boats.
^Parenthesized numbers are asymptotic t-statistics under the null-hypothesis of no association.
fects of water quality improvements. This data set contained the essential variables for
estimating recreational fishing demand functions.
The survey consisted of two parts. The first was a telephone screening of house-
holds, predominantly by telephone interviews, to determine the hunting, fishing, and
nonconsumptive recreation activities that household members took during 1980 and cer-
tain demographic characteristics of the household. The second part was a detailed ques-
tionnaire administered (typically in person) to selected individuals who indicated they
had hunted or fished in 1980, collecting information on activities and expenditures. Of
the 30,300 fishermen and hunters and 6,000 nonsconsumptive users interviewed nation-
wide, 760 pursued some of these activities in Maryland. Of these 760, 184 fished for
striped bass in the state in 1980.
For recreational fishing, the quality variable is assumed to be the number of fish12 N. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
caught per trip. From the survey we have information on individual catch rates so that
quality varies across individuals. The NSFHW defines three large sites for Maryland.
But almost all anglers fished at only one site out of the three. Hence we used a pooled
model rather than a varying parameters model. The demand function is specified as:
where Xj is striped bass days in 1980 (a trip measure was not available), p, is the i"^
individual's cost of striped bass fishing, q^ is the catch rate (fish/day), y, is the recrea-
tional fishing/hunting budget, and IBi and OB, are (0,1) variables representing ownership
of inboard or outboard boats. Catch rate variables are not available for individuals who
did not fish in 1980. We use an estimate of catch rate, based on fishing experiences and
capital stock, for nonfishing persons. The demand function estimates are shown in Table
6.
Calculating Beneflts of Improvements in Water Quality
Parameter estimates for each activity described the recreational choices made by the
representative user. From these estimates and information on the number of users, we
can estimate the benefits of improved water quality to the average user and then expand
to the total population. Indirect methods pose the most problems in calculating benefits,
and so they are addressed first.
We choose to analyze a 20 percent reduction in TNP and a 20 percent improvement
in catch rates. This requires the calculation of consumer surplus before and after the
change. When the demand function is linear, individual i's consumer surplus from site j
IS
= (Xi//(-2/3j,), (17)
where Xy is i's demand for trips to j and /3j, is the coefficient on cost of access in the
j"^ site demand function. The weighted average change in consumer surplus over
the sample for the j"* site, where the change is from q" to q', is
Tobit Estimates of the Demand for Striped Bass Fishing, 1980
Asymptotic
Effect Coefficient Estimate t-statistic
Constant (C) j3o -10.60 -5.79
Own price (p) /3, -.34 -7.52
Catch rate (q) /32 .34 2.13
Inboard Motor (IB) 0^ 12.65 4.49
Outboard Motor (OB) 0^ 6.66 3.47
Recreational Budget (y) (85 1.40 3.04
ff^ = 18.3; N = 760; Nonlimit Observations: 184Chesapeake Bay Water Quality 13
(18)
where N is the sample size and kj is the sampling weight determined by the sampling
scheme and reflecting how representative of the population a given observation in the
sample should be. The notation Xij(qj) and jSjiqj) implies that both the quantity demand
and the /3 coefficient are functions of the level of water quality. Calculating consumer
surplus for hypothetical environmental circumstances thus requires values for x" =
x(q''), (3" = ^{(t), x' = x(q'), and jS' = i3(q').
The first step is to use the results of model (10) to predict /3j, after hypothetical
changes in water quality. The coefficients are then used to determine values for the x"
and x' variables. The Tobit predicting equation which adjusts for the censored dependent
variable is
where <t> and $ are the density and cumulative distribution functions for the standard
normal.
There are two ways of obtaining the "before" and "after" x's for the consumer
surplus functions. One way is to use the predicting equation (19) to calculate both x° and
x' values. The second method is to accept the observed x as x" and then to adjust this x
by x' - x" to reflect the hypothetical change in water quality to obtain the x' (see
Bockstael and Strand, 1987, for details of the two approaches).
Because there is no clear theoretical reason to choose either of these approaches, we
calculate the results both ways. Both methods use formula (18) to calculate the change in
average consumer surplus. Method A calculates trip values as
(20)
Method B calculates these values in the following way:
x° = observed value of Xij (22)
xj = x° + xJ - i°. (23)
These mechanics, equations (17) through (23), the parameters in Tables (4) through (6),
and equations (14) and (16), as well as the independent variables provide the ingredients
for calculating benefits. Before we undertake this task, however, we suggest some limi-
tations of the estimates.
A review of the links between environmental policies designed to reduce pollution
and the benefits of these policies gives a systematic view of the limitations. Policies14 N. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
influence effluents directly through regulations and indirectly through changes in incen-
tives. Reductions in effluents will eventually improve the ambient water quality. Im-
provements in ambient quality when perceived by individuals eventually lead
to changes in behavior toward the Bay, implying benefits. Further, when nonusers
perceived improvements in the ambient water quality, they, too, may be better off.
There is potential for error in our understanding of each link in this process.
Our analysis has concentrated on the connection between ambient quality and eco-
nomic benefits. Logically, it rests on the relationship between environmental policy,
effluents, and ambient quality. Even if we were able to capture the exact nature of the
link between ambient water quality and behavior, there are honest differences about the
connection between effluents and ambient quality. And little is known about the link
between policy and effluents.
If the link between policy and ambient quality is ignored, the foremost uncertainty is
between ambient quality and behavior. Recall briefly how this link was estimated. For
boating and beach we used a varying parameters model to estimate the relationship
between the product of the total phosphorus and nitrogen in 1977 and trips in 1983 or
1984. There is considerable room for error in this relationship. Since nitrogen and
phosphorus are imperceptible, they serve as proxy measures of the aspects of ambient
quality that can be perceived. It is not unreasonable to expect such a relationship to hold
in principle, but empirical evidence is hard to come by.
For recreational fishing, the proxy used for water quality is the catch rate experi-
enced by individuals in 1980, the year the trips were taken. There is a complex and
uncertain chain of relationships between improvements in ambient quality and growth in
the density of fish stocks. There is additional uncertainty in the connection between fish
stocks and catch rates. And further, there is no connection between a 20% increase in
catch rates and a 20% decrease in TNP.
In addition to the severe difficulties in inferring the relationships between ambient
quality and willingness to pay, there are two other significant sources of error in comput-
ing aggregate benefits. First, there is the problem of sampling and nonsampling error
associated with the measurement of the number of trips per participant and the number
of participants in each activity, as well as measurements of exogenous variables such as
costs per trip. The boating survey is a good example of nonsampling error for trips. This
survey was by mail, so in a sense the respondents are volunteers. The return rate was
70%. We do not know whether those who completed their questionnaires were represen-
tative of the boating population as a whole.
We have also used only segments of the total population in our analysis of benefits.
The boaters are limited to those who trailer their boats, the fishermen to those who fish
for striped bass, and the beach users to those who use public-access western shore
beaches. In the boating and flshing analysis, we exclude non-Maryland households. In
the contingent valuation and beach analysis, only 20% of Virginia's population are
sampled and about 80% of Maryland's households. In every instance, a major portion of
users is excluded.
The second source of error comes from aggregating beneflts across activities. There
are two forms: doublecounting and aggregation bias. Doublecounting occurs because a
substantial number of boaters also fish, and many fishermen have boats. The conceptual
aggregation bia occurs because of the jointness of choice among sites for a given activity
and among activities. For example, the choice of visiting Sandy Point versus Point
Lookout may depend in part on water quality, but enhancing water quality at both sitesChesapeake Bay Water Quality 15
may increase attendance at only one site, making the addition of benefits across sites
incorrect.
Finally, we study only three activities: boating, fishing, and swimming. Cleaner
water enhances the value of many other recreational and commercial uses of the Bay. We
limit our analysis to boating, fishing, and swimming because we can obtain data of
adequate quality only for these activities.
Mindful of these difficulties, we nonetheless estimate aggregate benefits of improv-
ing the Bay's water quality. We present low, middle, and high benefits for the beach use,
boating, and fishing, and compare those with the total benefits derived from the contin-
gent valuation experiment. Comparing the ranges of these independent sources of bene-
fits helps us judge the magnitude of aggregate benefits.
The benefit estimates depend on the computational method and the proportionate
change in the proxy for ambient quality and catch rate. The 20% reduction in nitrogen
and phosphorus for boating and beach use and a 20% increase in the catch rate should be
interpreted loosely as moderate improvements in the quality of the Bay. The change in
nitrogen and phosphorus is a proxy for changes in most ambient determinants of water
quality. In particular, we should not interpret the estimated effect of nitrogen and phos-
phorus as an "all else equal" effect. It is reasonable to suppose that most harmful
pollutants decrease by about the same proportion. Further, to counteract the problem of
aggregating across sites for a given activity, we select as a pessimistic estimate the
lowest estimate of the benefits of improving the quality by 20% at the one, most impor-
tant site.
Table 7 summarizes the estimates of aggregate benefits for boaters, sportsfishermen,
and beach users. The range of estimates from pessimistic to optimistic is provided by
two sources: variation induced by the method of calculating benefits (i.e., using actual
trips versus predicted trips) and variation caused by choosing one site rather than the
sum over all sites. The procedure is as follows. First, calculate benefits for each site by
method A (predicted trips) and method B (actual trips). Find which method gives the
larger benefit estimate and sum across sites. This is the optimistic estimate. The
intermediate estimate is the smaller of these results summed across sites. The pessimistic
estimate is the lower estimate (by method A or method B) for only the largest site.
For stripped bass fishing, the nature of the analysis does not allow disaggretation
across sites. The pessimistic and optimistic estimates for fishing are the lower and higher
estimates from the two methods of calculation. In this case, the intermediate estimate is
simply the mean of the pessimistic and optimistic estimates.
The aggregate measures of willingness to pay for water quality improvements are
revealing for several reasons. First, regardless of which benefit measure we use (pessi-
mistic, intermediate, or optimistic), the returns to beach use are the greatest. This is
primarily because a larger proportion of the population engages in some beach-going
during a year than boating or fishing, and this group is no less sensitive to changes in
water quality than the boating-fishing group.
A second implication of the results is the importance of regional variation in water
quality. If we were able to clean up the water only around Anne Arundel County, we
would still go a long way toward satisfying some of the human needs for using the Bay.
Whereas confining a water quality improvement program to a particular locality may not
be technically, ecologically, or politically feasible, these figures suggest that we might be
able to refine clean-up strategies by looking more closely at the regional variation in
benefits.16 N. E. Bockstael, K. E. McConnell, and I. E. Strand
Table 7
Aggregate Benefits for Three Water-Related Activities from a "20%" Improvement in












Activity Pessimistic ($ Thousand) Optimistic
Public western shore beach use (1984)'
Boating with trailered boat (1983)^
Striped bass sportfishing (1980)'
'From Table 4.8, Bockstael, et al. (1988). Pessimistic estimate is the method B value for Sandy
Point, the average is the sum of method B values over all 10 sites, and the optimistic is the sum of
method A values over all sites.
¥rom Table 5.13, Bockstael et al. (1988). All per boater estimates expanded to 80,000 boaters
trailedng boats. Pessimistic estimate is the low value (method A) for Anne Arundel County, the
average estimate is the sum of low values (method A) across all counties, and the optimistic value
is the sum of high values (method B) across all countries.
'From Tkble 6.2, Bockstael et al. (1988). Pessimistic value is the value using method B, average
value is the average of the pessimistic and optimistic value, optimistic value is the value using
method A.
The values shown in Table 7 help in assessing the contingent valuation estimates
shown in Table 8. We might expect the CV estimates in our study to exceed any of the
individual behavior-based estimates because the former is more inclusive. Comparing
the $67 million estimate even to the pessimistic estimate for beach use suggests that the
CV values are not vastly overstated. The lower bound behaviorally based benefit esti-
mate for beach use at only one beach (Sandy Point) is about one-seventh the size of the
all-inclusive CV value. The CV value does not appear to be out of line with the behav-
iorally based values.
Table 8






















^Population is the Washington, D.C., and Baltimore SMSA's.
^Willingness to accept tax increase to raise Chesapeake Bay water quality from a level
unacceptable for swimming and/or other related activities to a level acceptable for swimming.
The average willingness to pay plus (optimistic) or minus (pessimistic) one standard error in
estimate.Chesapeake Bay Water Quality 17
Conclusion
Tables 7 and 8 give estimates of the annual benefits of improving water quality in the
Bay. The estimates range from slightly less than $10 million to more than $100 million.
There are numerous errors in all estimates. Further, several activities and populations
have been omitted. But based on these estimates, it seems plausible that the annual
returns to cleaning up the Chesapeake lie somewhere in this range. This judgment is
based on our limited analysis of existing surveys.
We recapitulate the meaning of the numbers in the tables. Society has undertaken an
investment program. The nature of the program is the cleanup of the Chesapeake Bay.
The costs of the program include construction of sewage treatment plants, funding of
government programs to regulate and monitor agricultural effluents, subsidy of best
management practice, installation of industrial waste disposal systems, and restrictions
on housing development. The annual returns on the investment program are measured
by what people are willing to pay for the improved services. This is the dividend yielded
by the public's investment program. Our estimate of this divided is in the range of $10-
$100 million, in 1984 dollars.
For several reasons, the long-run benefits may be higher than the estimates in Tables
7 and 8. First, as people learn that the Bay has become cleaner, they will adjust their
preferences toward Bay recreation. This is especially true of people who do not cur-
rently use the Bay. These people have been largely excluded from the analysis. Second,
the population and income of the area have grown since 1984 and are likely to grow
more, increasing the demand for and value of improvements in water quality. Finally, the
estimates (Table 8) ignore the existence value for households outside the Baltimore-
Washington SMS A. The Chesapeake Bay is a nationally prominent resource. Its im-
proved health is of value to many who will never use it.
The magnitude of the estimates raise two interesting issues. The first relates to the
fact that indirect methods exploit behavior toward the Bay in its polluted state. The
success of these measures relies on users' abilities to discriminate among sites of differ-
ent quality even in its polluted state. To yield more returns to the public paying for
improvements in the Bay, it would be useful to provide the public information on the
actual state of regional variation in water quality. The substantial publicity on
improving the Bay's water quality may obscure the fact that there are locations of clean
water.
A second issue concerns the value of access. When the Bay's water quality is poor,
the public's loss from having limited shoreline access is meager. But as water quality
improves, the public stands to gain from improving conditions of physical access. Pro-
grams such as boat launching sites, fishing piers, and simply local beaches with adequate
parking then become more attractive uses of public funds.
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Notes
1. Chesapeake Executive Council, Chesapeake Bay Restoration and Protection Plan, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Sept. 1985.
2. Chesapeake Bay Restoration and Protection Plan, Chapter 2, p. 1.
3. As is obvious from (3) and (4), the response and the function estimated are independent of
income. We believe that the error in measuring income is too great to allow the proposed tax to
give a separate effect.
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